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INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia influenced constitutional and statutory interpretation in
U.S. courts in important ways. Regarding constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia argued that the role of courts is to apply the original public meaning of the Constitution, as best as they can determine it. In defending this
position, Justice Scalia moved scholars, judges, and lawyers to account more
for constitutional text, structure, and historical practice when interpreting
the Constitution.1 Regarding statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia argued
that the role of courts is to apply the meaning that statutory text conveys to a
reasonable and informed reader. In defending this position, Justice Scalia
moved scholars, judges, and lawyers to think harder about questions involving statutory text, legislative history, legislative purpose, legislative intent,
canons of construction, and so on. During his tenure on the Supreme Court,
Justice Scalia applied these methods of interpretation to a wide range of constitutional and statutory questions.
This Essay examines a specific area that Justice Scalia influenced
through the methods of interpretation that he applied—namely, the question of “implied rights of action.” When may a plaintiff bring a federal right
of action for damages for the violation of a federal statute that does not
expressly create one? This question is one of a series of related questions,
such as when may a plaintiff pursue equitable relief for a statutory violation,
or pursue legal or equitable relief for a constitutional violation—absent
express congressional authorization. The Court has considered the question
of when a plaintiff may pursue damages for a federal statutory violation on its
own terms, however, and this Essay will address this question alone.2 At one
time, the Supreme Court treated this question as a question of federal judicial power to apply federal common law. Today, in part due to Justice
Scalia’s influence, the Court treats the question of implied rights of action as
a question of statutory interpretation.
Justice Scalia advocated two positions that influenced how the Court
determines whether a private damages action is available for the violation of
a federal statute. First, Justice Scalia contended that legislative action, not
unenacted policy considerations, should determine whether a private right of
action is available for the violation of a federal statute. Second, Justice Scalia
1 See William K. Kelley, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Long Game, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1601 (2012); Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. et al., In Memoriam: Justice Antonin Scalia, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2016).
2 Even though this Essay does not address implied rights of action for damages for
constitutional violations, or the availability of equitable remedies for federal statutory or
constitutional violations, the history this Essay describes in Part III may be relevant to those
questions as well.
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argued that courts should apply a textual method—rather than a purposive
one—to determine whether Congress authorized a civil damages remedy for
a federal statutory violation. In 2001, a majority of the Court adopted both of
these positions in Alexander v. Sandoval.3 In Sandoval, the Court (1) held that
congressional intent determines whether a plaintiff has a right of action for
the violation of a federal statute and (2) applied a textual method to ascertain whether Congress demonstrated such an intent.4
Judges and scholars have argued that the approach the Court adopted in
Sandoval is not faithful to historical practice—a critique that aligns with Justice Scalia’s commitment to resolve questions of federal judicial power (like
other constitutional questions) in accord with historical understandings and
practice. Critics have argued that historical practice refutes the position that
legislative intent should determine the existence of a private right of action
for a federal statutory violation.5 In determining questions of federal judicial
power, as in determining constitutional questions generally, Justice Scalia
placed significant reliance on historical practice. As a matter of historical
practice, it is argued, federal courts adjudicated common law actions for violations of federal statutes since the founding regardless of whether a violated
federal statute itself created a right of action. This historical practice, the
argument goes, demonstrates that federal courts today should be understood
to have power to adjudicate private damages claims for the violation of a
federal statute regardless of whether the statute itself authorizes a cause of
action. If Justice Scalia had recognized this historical practice, the argument
suggests, he would have understood under the demands of his own method
of constitutional interpretation that the federal judicial power includes
power to provide legal remedies for violations of federal statutes regardless of
whether Congress authorized them. In other words, fidelity to historical
practice requires a return to the practice of federal courts supplying implied
rights of action as a form of federal common law.
This Essay seeks to demonstrate that historical practice in fact does not
refute the approach that Justice Scalia articulated for the Court in Sandoval.
The claim that federal courts historically adjudicated common law actions for
federal statutory violations, independently of any congressional action, overlooks important early acts of Congress. The First Congress did not leave federal courts free to determine for themselves what causes of action would be
available to litigants. Rather, in two little-noticed acts—little-noticed at least
today—Congress defined the causes of action that federal courts could adjudicate. In the Process Acts of 17896 and 1792,7 Congress directed federal
courts to apply the same forms of action as those used by the courts of the
state in which they sat. Understood in proper legal and historical context,
these acts directed federal courts to borrow state causes of action to remedy
3
4
5
6
7

532 U.S. 275 (2001).
Id. at 286.
See infra Part II.
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1792).
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL508.txt

2080

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

5-JUL-17

15:26

[vol. 92:5

common law injuries, including injuries resulting from the violation of a federal statute. Congress continued this directive in the 1870s in the Conformity
Act.8
Pursuant to these directives, when federal courts historically adjudicated
common law causes of action for federal statutory violations, they were not
doing so simply upon their own authority; rather, they were doing so pursuant to an express congressional authorization. With the eventual death of
the forms of action in the early twentieth century and with the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1930s, the congressional authorization to federal courts to borrow state causes of action dissipated, and the
question of implied rights of action, as it is understood today, arose.
Any argument about implied rights of action and historical practice
must account for these acts of Congress. Because federal courts had congressional authorization to adjudicate common law causes of action for much of
U.S. history, the fact that historically federal courts adjudicated common law
actions for federal statutory violations does not prove in itself that federal
courts had independent authority to adjudicate such actions, absent congressional authorization. To the contrary, there is reason to think that federal
courts would have been understood to lack authority to give common law
remedies for federal statutory violations had Congress not authorized them
to borrow state common law causes of action. In any event, regardless of
whether historical practice proves that federal courts need congressional
authorization to provide a damages remedy for a federal statutory violation,
historical practice fails to prove that federal courts always had authority to
supply such actions on their own.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes Justice Scalia’s influence
on the development of the Supreme Court’s implied-rights-of-action jurisprudence. It explains both how he argued that the question of implied rights of
action was a question of legislative intent and how he applied textual methods to determine such intent. Part II describes an important critique of his
approach—namely, the claim that historical practice proves that federal
courts may supply private rights of action for federal statutory violations
regardless of congressional intent. Part III critically evaluates this critique of
Justice Scalia’s position. The idea that federal courts historically applied
common law causes of action to remedy federal statutory violations without
congressional authorization is a myth. From the first, federal courts heard
only those causes of action that Congress had authorized them to hear. And
there is reason to think that early federal courts would not have been understood to have power to define their own causes of action had Congress not
provided this authorization from the start. At a minimum, however, historical practice does not establish that early federal courts understood themselves to have power to define and apply common law actions for federal
statutory violations absent congressional authorization to do so.
8

Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (repealed 1934).
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Justice Scalia made two significant contributions in the area of implied
rights of action, beginning shortly after he joined the Court. First, Justice
Scalia argued that, as a separation of powers matter, legislative intent—rather
than judicial discretion—should determine whether a private right of action
is available to remedy a federal statutory violation. His view was that the
Court’s role is to determine whether the text of a statute demonstrates that
Congress made a private right of action available. Second, Justice Scalia
argued that the Court should apply a textual method to determine whether
Congress made such a right of action available, not a purposive one or one
otherwise based on legislative history. In 2001, a majority of the Court
adopted both of these positions in Alexander v. Sandoval.9 This Part describes
these aspects of Justice Scalia’s approach to implied rights of action.
A.

Legislative Intent

First, Justice Scalia argued that legislative intent—not unenacted policy
considerations—should determine whether a private right of action is available for the violation of a federal statute. To understand his position, it is
useful to recount—at least briefly—the various approaches to implied rights
of action that the Court had taken in the decades before Justice Scalia joined
the Court.
1.

From Federal Common Law to Legislative Intent

In the two decades before Justice Scalia joined the Court, the Court
moved from applying rights of action as a matter of federal common law to
determining the existence of rights of action from congressional intent.
a.

Federal Common Law

In the 1960s, the Court exercised a broad power to fashion private rights
of action as the Court thought necessary to effectuate congressional purposes. The Court’s 1964 decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak10 typifies this
approach. In Borak, the Court held that private parties may bring a right of
action to remedy violations of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, a provision that did not itself create a right of action.11 In so holding,
the Court determined that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”12 The Court observed that it “is not uncommon for federal courts to
fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned.”13 Under this
9 532 U.S. 275.
10 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
11 Id. at 430.
12 Id. at 433.
13 Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Textile Workers Union of
Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)).
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approach, the Court supplied a cause of action without determining whether
or not Congress intended that one exist. This approach thus involved the
application of “federal common law”—that is, “federal rules of decision
whose content cannot be traced directly by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands.”14
b.

Cort Multifactor Test

A decade later, in Cort v. Ash,15 the Court applied a multifactor balancing test to determine whether a plaintiff had an implied right of action for
the violation of a federal statute. Under this approach, the Court examined
(a) whether the plaintiff belonged to a class for the special benefit of which
the statute was enacted, (b) whether there was a legislative intent to create a
remedy, (c) whether a remedy would be consistent with legislative purpose,
and (d) whether the existence of a cause of action was a matter traditionally
relegated to state law.16 This test included “legislative intent” as one of a
number of factors the Court would consider.
The Court applied this test in 1979 in Cannon v. University of Chicago to
find that a plaintiff could bring an implied right of action for damages to
remedy an alleged violation of Title IX. 17 The Cannon decision sparked a
vigorous dissent by Justice Powell, who argued that the Court should focus
exclusively on legislative intent in determining whether a right of action is
available for a federal statutory violation.18 Justice Powell contended that
“the mode of analysis” that the Court had “applied in the recent past cannot
be squared with the doctrine of the separation of powers.”19 “As the Legislative Branch, Congress . . . should determine when private parties are to be
given causes of action under legislation it adopts.”20 Thus, “[w]hen Congress
chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should not
assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy.”21 Instead, federal
courts should entertain rights of action for federal statutory violations only
when they have “the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact
intended such an action to exist.”22
14 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 635 (7th ed. 2015).
15 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
16 Id. at 78.
17 441 U.S. 677, 687–710 (1979).
18 Id. at 730–49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 730.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 730–31.
22 Id. at 749. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Rehnquist agreed
with Justice Powell that “[t]he question of the existence of a private right of action is basically one of statutory construction.” Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist explained that,
[n]ot only is it “far better” for Congress to so specify when it intends private litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason this Court in the future
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Legislative Intent

Shortly after the Court decided Cannon, it shifted its analysis toward the
analysis that Justice Powell had advocated. In 1979, in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,23 the Court held that a plaintiff could not bring a private right of
action for the violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.24 In so holding, the Court defined its task as “limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create [a] private right of action.”25
Under this mode of analysis, the Court determined that “there is no basis in
the language of § 17(a) for inferring that a civil cause of action for damages
lay in favor of anyone.”26 Because it was “not at liberty to legislate,” the Court
concluded that “[i]f there is to be a federal damages remedy under these
circumstances, Congress must provide it.”27
***
When Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986, then, the Court had
moved in the direction of determining the existence of implied rights of
action on the basis of legislative intent. The Court continued, however, to
rely in certain cases on the test of Cort v. Ash to determine such intent.28 In
such cases, the Court considered itself free to ascertain congressional intent
from the range of contextual factors that Cort identified.
2.

Justice Scalia and Legislative Intent

Early in his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia argued in a
concurring opinion—as Justice Powell had argued in dissent in Cannon—
that the creation of a private right of action is a legislative decision, not a
judicial one. In Thompson v. Thompson,29 the Court held in 1988 that no private right of action was available for violations of the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA).30 Justice Scalia agreed with this conclusion,
but he disagreed with the Court’s method of reaching it.31 The Thompson
Court applied the Cort test to determine that no cause of action was available.
Although “[t]he intent of Congress remains the ultimate issue,” the Court
explained, a “focus on congressional intent does not mean that we require
evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in
should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on
the part of the Legislative Branch.
Id. at 718.
23 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
24 See id. at 563 n.2 (containing the statutory language).
25 Id. at 568.
26 Id. at 571.
27 Id. at 579.
28 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
29 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012).
31 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188–92 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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mind the creation of a private cause of action.”32 Rather, “Congress’ ‘intent
may appear implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the
circumstances of its enactment.’”33
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s
understanding of congressional intent. Justice Scalia argued that in order for
there to be an implied right of action, a statute must demonstrate “an actual
congressional intent to create a private right of action.”34 He wrote that he
was “at a loss to imagine what congressional intent to create a private right of
action might mean, if it does not mean that Congress had in mind the creation of a private right of action.”35 “[T]o be sure,” he continued, “the existence of intent may be inferred from various indicia; but that is worlds apart
from today’s Delphic pronouncement that intent is required but need not
really exist.”36 Justice Scalia thus characterized the judicial search for congressional intent as a search for what Congress actually intended. Otherwise,
he contended, courts would be imputing to Congress an intent that Congress
did not demonstrate in the statute itself. Quoting Justice Powell’s dissent in
Cannon, Justice Scalia concluded, “[w]hen Congress chooses not to provide a
private civil remedy, federal courts should not assume the legislative role of
creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge their jurisdiction.”37 In this
respect, Justice Scalia more or less signed on to the critique of implied rights
of action that Justice Powell had articulated in his Cannon dissent and pushed
it forward.38
B.

Textual Method

Perhaps Justice Scalia’s signal contribution in the area of implied rights
of action was his insistence that the Court apply a textual method to determine congressional intent. If the judicial task is to determine whether Congress actually intended a right of action to exist, then the next question is
how a court should make that determination. In this regard, Justice Scalia
both rejected the Cort test as a means of determining congressional intent
and refused to draw inferences about legislative intent from “contemporary
legal context.”39
32 Id. at 179 (majority opinion).
33 Id. (quoting Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979)).
34 Id. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 189.
37 Id. at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 730–31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
38 See also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Raising up causes
of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law
courts, but not for federal tribunals.”).
39 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (referring to the “contemporary
legal context”).
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Rejecting the Cort Factors

First, Justice Scalia rejected the idea that the test of Cort v. Ash is an
appropriate means of determining legislative intent. In Thompson, in holding
that no implied right of action is available for violations of the PKPA, the
Court explained:
In determining whether to infer a private cause of action from a federal
statute, our focal point is Congress’ intent in enacting the statute. As guides
to discerning that intent, we have relied on the four factors set out in Cort v.
Ash, along with other tools of statutory construction.40

Justice Scalia wrote in his concurring opinion that the Court’s ongoing
use of the Cort test was inconsistent with its more recent decisions that legislative intent was determinative.41 “It could not be plainer,” Justice Scalia
wrote, “that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, . . . converting one of its four factors (congressional intent)
into the determinative factor, with the other three merely indicative of its presence or absence.”42
2.

Rejecting Legal Context Absent Statutory Text

Second, Justice Scalia refused to draw inferences about legislative intent
from contemporary legal context alone. Before he joined the Court, the
Court analyzed in certain cases whether the Court’s own practice of inferring
private rights of action demonstrated a congressional intent that one exists
(on the ground that the Court should impute to Congress an awareness that
the Court would provide one). In Cannon, for example, in determining
whether a private right of action was available under Title IX, the Court
explained that Title IX was virtually identical to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in its language and administrative enforcement mechanisms.43
“In 1972 when Title IX was enacted,” the Court explained, “the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy.”44
Because “[i]t is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives,
like other citizens, know the law,” the Court concluded that it was “especially
justified in presuming both that those representatives were aware of the prior
interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent
with respect to Title IX.”45
In his concurring opinion in Thompson, Justice Scalia rejected any
broader use of contemporary legal context to discern the existence of a private right of action. When there is no indication in the text that Congress
intended to create a right of action, he explained, an examination of “the
‘context’ of the legislation for indication of intent to create a private right of
40 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
42 Id. (citations omitted).
43 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694–95 (1979).
44 Id. at 696.
45 Id. at 696–98.
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action . . . is entirely superfluous, since context alone cannot suffice.”46 As
for Cannon’s use of legal context, he simply observed, without endorsing or
rejecting that use, that the Court had used legal context in only two cases,
including Cannon, “both of which involved statutory language that, in the
judicial interpretation of related legislation prior to the subject statute’s
enactment, or of the same legislation prior to its reenactment, had been held
to create private rights of action.”47 Regardless of whether he thought that
this use of contemporary legal context was justified, Justice Scalia rejected
the use of contemporary legal context for any purpose other than determining the meaning of statutory text.
C.

Alexander v. Sandoval

In 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, a majority of the Court adopted most of
the analysis that Justice Scalia had argued should govern implied rights of
action.48 In Sandoval, the plaintiffs brought an action for the alleged violation of section 602 of Title VI. They claimed that the Alabama Department
of Public Safety had violated regulations issued by the U.S. Department of
Justice prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination when the Department
decided to administer state driver’s license exams in English only.49 The
Court previously had recognized a private right of action for section 601 of
Title VI; the question presented was whether a private right of action existed
for violations of section 602 as well.50 In holding that no right of action was
available, the Court (1) adopted Justice Scalia’s view that the salient question
is whether the statute displays an actual congressional intent to create a private right of action, and (2) applied a more textual method to answer that
question, sidestepping (without overruling) the test of Cort v. Ash, and refusing to consider evidence of contemporary legal context.
1.

Legislative Intent

First, the Sandoval Court adopted Justice Scalia’s view that the appropriate question for determining whether a plaintiff may pursue a private right of
action for the violation of a federal statute is whether the statute demonstrates an actual congressional intent that one exist. “Like substantive federal
law itself,” Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, “private rights of action to
enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”51 The relevant judicial
inquiry, in the Court’s view, was thus whether the statute displays an actual
congressional intent to create a cause of action:
46 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
47 Id. at 189–90 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. 677; and then citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)).
48 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
49 Id. at 278–79.
50 Id. at 279.
51 Id. at 286.
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The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without
it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter
how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the
statute.52

In this passage, a five-Justice majority of the Court adopted Justice Scalia’s
view that implied rights of action are a function of what a statute conveys
about actual congressional intent.
2.

Textual Method

The Court further explained in Sandoval that it should determine congressional intent by examining the “text and structure” of the statute.53 In
adopting this position, the Court rejected the argument that it should consider “the expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in light of the
contemporary legal context.”54 Although the Court acknowledged that it
had examined contemporary legal context in prior cases when Congress had
enacted “verbatim statutory text that courts had previously interpreted to create a private right of action,”55 the Court observed that it had “never
accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of text.”56 The reason it had
never done so, the Court explained, is that “[i]n determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal
context matters only to the extent it clarifies text.”57 The Court thus categorically rejected the use of contemporary legal context to determine the existence of a right of action absent text demonstrating that one exists. “We
therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress’s intent
with the text and structure of Title VI.”58
This method of discerning congressional intent from the text and structure of the statute appears to leave little room for application of the Cort
multifactor test. In Thompson, Justice Scalia, writing only for himself, had
argued that the Court already had overturned Cort v. Ash by focusing its analysis on legislative intent. In his view, the Court should ascertain legislative
intent by examining what the text and structure of the statute convey about
it.59 The Cort factors extend beyond the bounds of that task. The Court did
not apply the Cort factors in Sandoval, but neither did the Court outright
reject the test or overrule the case. Notwithstanding the importance of Cort
v. Ash in prior implied-rights-of-action cases, the Sandoval Court cited it only
52 Id. at 286–87 (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 288.
54 Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
55 Id. at 288.
56 Id.
57 Id. (citation omitted).
58 Id.
59 Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188–89 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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for the proposition that it had abandoned Borak’s understanding of implied
rights of action.60 It is possible that a majority of the Sandoval Court did not
agree on whether to overturn the Cort test, and the Court thus simply avoided
discussing its ongoing relevance.61
II. CRITIQUES

OF

JUSTICE SCALIA’S APPROACH

Justice Scalia’s approach to implied rights of action has been subject to
various critiques. One critique is that courts seeking to determine congressional intent to create a cause of action should not be limited to examining
the text and structure of the statute. This critique argues that in this context,
as in others, courts should apply a less textual method of statutory interpretation, such as a more purposive one.62 Another critique—the one on which
this Part focuses—is that the existence of an implied right of action should
not be a question of legislative intent at all. This critique relies heavily on
historical judicial practice. For much of U.S. history, this critique argues,
federal courts supplied common law causes of action for federal statutory
violations regardless of whether Congress authorized a cause of action—and
thus regardless of congressional intent. This historical practice, the argument goes, demonstrates that federal courts have power to provide private
60 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287.
61 The Supreme Court has not relied on the Cort factors to determine whether a private right of action is available for a federal statutory violation since its decision in Sandoval. Certain U.S. Court of Appeals cases have treated Sandoval as displacing the Cort factors
in this context, at least to the extent that the application of those factors is inconsistent
with congressional intent. See, e.g., San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 32
(1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[t]he proponent of an implied private right of action
cannot prevail under the four-factor Cort test in the face of a showing that Congress probably did not intend to create” a right of action); Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294,
299–300 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval strongly
suggests that the Court has abandoned the Cort v. Ash test.” (citation omitted)). Other
Court of Appeals cases continue to apply the Cort factors as a means of discerning congressional intent. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 2014)
(explaining that “[t]o discern Congress’s intent, we look first to the text and structure of
the statute,” and “we also consider the factors enumerated in Cort” (citations omitted)
(quoting Lindsay v. Ass’n of Prof’l Flight Attendants, 581 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1170–71
(9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although “the Supreme Court essentially collapsed the
Cort test into a single focus” on legislative intent, “our court has found the four factor test
helpful, and has continued to employ it to guide [the] central project of discerning Congress’s intent” (alteration in original) (quoting Okrin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
62 See, e.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
“adopts a methodology that blinds itself to important evidence of congressional intent,”
including the purposes of the underlying statute); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 179–80 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
should determine the existence of a cause of action in light of Congress’s presumed understanding of contemporary legal context).
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rights of action to remedy federal statutory violations even in the absence of
congressional authorization.
This argument—which judges and scholars have asserted both before
and after Justice Scalia joined the Court—includes at least two different
threads. One thread is that as a matter of observable historical fact, U.S.
courts traditionally created or recognized common law actions to remedy
statutory violations as they saw fit.63 Another thread of this argument is that,
as a matter of principle, an important role of courts traditionally was to provide a remedy for any legal wrong.64 This argument treats the maxim ubi jus,
ibi remedium as reflecting a longstanding federal judicial practice that should
endure today: because federal courts traditionally were understood to have
power to give private remedies for statutory violations, they should be understood to have no less power today, regardless of whether any given statute
expressly creates or authorizes a private damages action for its
enforcement.65
63 See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1532, 1542 (1972) (presuming “a common law background in which courts created
damage remedies as a matter of course”); cf. Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28 (2014) (“For most of this nation’s history, the traditional view was that
federal courts could elaborate the remedial implications of statutes and the Constitution in
a common law mode.”); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 565
(1981) (“It is doubtful . . . that the Constitution mandates . . . a restrictive doctrine of
implied private actions. Federal courts possess recognized power to create substantive
common law in areas of important federal interest. . . . The federal judiciary, then, has
both the power and the responsibility to make substantive common law ancillary to federal
statutes.”).
64 See H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private
Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 534 (1986) (arguing that in
English and early American courts “an adequate private remedy existed for every statutory
wrong,” and observing that “[t]he notion that an adequate private remedy existed for every
statutory wrong played an important role in . . . Marbury v. Madison”); Susan J. Stabile, The
Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864 (1996) (“The early view of the courts on the question of
when it is appropriate to imply a private cause of action from a federal statute that itself
does not provide for such an action was that an individual is entitled to an adequate remedy for any legal wrong, whether common law wrong or statutory wrong.” (footnotes omitted)); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights
in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 676 (1987) (“Historically, . . . tort actions on
statutes provided a clear example of the common law striving to provide remedies for the
violation of rights.”); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated
Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2001) (explaining that traditionally “courts strove to
provide an appropriate remedy” for the violation of a right, and “[c]ourts frequently
applied this standard in actions to enforce a statute”).
65 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 176–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that for 200 years
“[f]ashioning appropriate remedies for the violation of rules of law designed to protect a
class of citizens was the routine business of judges,” and “the same practice prevailed in
federal courts with regard to federal statutes that left questions of remedy open for judges
to answer”); see also Gordan Gamm & Howard Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41
UMKC L. REV. 292, 297 (1972) (citing ubi jus, ibi remedium as a basis for supporting a broad
implied rights doctrine); Linda Sheryl Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL508.txt

2090

unknown

Seq: 14

notre dame law review

5-JUL-17

15:26

[vol. 92:5

To the extent that this critique relies on historical practice, it seeks to
employ a methodology that Justice Scalia himself defended in resolving constitutional questions, including questions of federal judicial power. If this
critique is correct, then Justice Scalia would have taken two wrong turns in
his thinking about implied rights of action. The first wrong turn would be
his assumption that the question of implied rights of action is a question of
discerning actual legislative intent. If U.S. courts have power, as revealed by
historical practice, to provide private rights of action for federal statutory
violations regardless of whether Congress authorized a right of action, then
the focus on actual legislative intent would be misguided. The second wrong
turn would be deploying a textual method of statutory interpretation to
determine legislative intent. If actual legislative intent is not determinative,
then there is no good reason why a court may not evaluate congressional
purposes in determining whether a cause of action should be available as a
matter of federal common law, or why a court may not purposively interpret
a statute to allow a private damages action when the text says nothing on the
matter.
The problem with this critique, however, is that it does not accurately
represent historical practice. This critique overlooks the fact that historically
Congress did in fact authorize the causes of action that federal courts could
hear. In other words, this critique overlooks the fact that historically federal
courts did not supply private rights of action for federal statutory violations
independently of congressional authority. Instead, federal courts recognized
such actions pursuant to an express congressional directive. The next Part
describes this lost history and how it bears on Justice Scalia’s approach to
implied rights of action.
III. IMPLIED RIGHTS

OF

ACTION

AND

HISTORICAL PRACTICE

It is true enough that federal courts historically adjudicated private
causes of action for federal statutory violations in certain cases. The largely
forgotten fact, however, is that they did so with congressional authorization.
The First Congress (and subsequent Congresses) provided federal courts
with specific direction regarding what causes of action they could hear.
Thus, federal courts did not historically supply causes of action for federal
statutory violations independently of congressional intent. Rather, they adjudicated those common law causes of action that Congress authorized them to
Statutory Violations: The Separation of Powers Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469, 471–72 (1980)
(“The historical, indeed philosophical, origins of the doctrine of remedial implication
appear to hark back to the ancient, common law doctrine of ubi jus, ibi remedium—where
there is a right, there is a remedy—and to eighteenth-century English decisions holding
that nonperformance of statutory duties embodied in criminal statutes could support a
private action in tort to secure compensation for resultant damages.” (footnotes omitted));
Paul Joseph McMahon & Gerald Jay Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action:
Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167, 167 (1975) (“Judicial implication of a
private cause of action for violation of a statute has its roots in the ancient English common law doctrine of ubi jus, ibi remedium . . . .”).
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hear. This Part will discuss this history and its implications for Justice Scalia’s
approach to implied rights of action and the historical claims of his critics.
A.

Reevaluating Historical Practice

To understand the practices of federal courts in providing legal remedies for federal statutory violations, it is important to appreciate both (1) the
nature of a cause of action as causes of action were understood by early federal courts, and (2) early acts of Congress that specified the causes of action
that federal courts could hear. Professor Bradford Clark and I have discussed
these matters at length in earlier works. This Section provides a summary of
our prior findings.66 These findings demonstrate that historical federal judicial practice does not in and of itself establish a federal judicial power to
supply causes of action as federal common law.
1.

The Nature of a Cause of Action

It is necessary to appreciate two important aspects of judicial practice in
England and America at the time of the founding in order to understand
how historical federal judicial practice relates to the modern question of
implied rights of action. First, at the founding, the existence of a cause of
action was a question of local law, not general law, and each nation was
understood to have its own system of rights of action. Second, the existence
of a right of action followed from the availability of a “form of action” or a
“form of proceeding.” On the basis of these well-accepted features of the
common law system, early federal legislation specified the causes of action
that federal courts could adjudicate.67
a.

Local Law, Not General Law

First, each nation determined for itself what kinds of injuries its courts
would remedy. In other words, “local law,” not “general law,” defined the
causes of action available in English and American courts. There was no
transnational, general law system that defined rights of action or their availability.68 As Blackstone explained in his Commentaries, local English law
defined the causes of action that English courts could hear. “Every nation
must and will abide by its own municipal laws” regarding what causes of
action its courts may hear, “which various accidents conspire to render different in almost every country in Europe.”69 In other words, English courts did
66 The matters discussed in this Part are discussed in more detail in Anthony J. Bellia
Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609 (2015), and Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III
and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777 (2004). The discussion in this Part draws upon
the evidence and analysis set forth in those articles.
67 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 628.
68 Id.
69 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *86–87.
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not look to general law to define the causes of action they could hear; rather,
they looked to the local law of England.
b.

Forms of Proceeding

Second, the local laws in England and American states defined what
causes of action were available in their respective courts by providing certain
“forms of action” or “forms of proceeding.” In the late eighteenth century,
the English common law understood a cause of action to be available if local
law provided a form of proceeding capable of redressing the harm in question.70 Today, the U.S. legal system generally treats the availability of a cause
of action as a question of substantive law.71 The question is whether a person
or entity suffering an injury is legally entitled to request a judicial remedy for
the injury.72 If so, that person or entity has a cause of action. When the
Constitution was adopted, however, the legal system understood a cause of
action differently. An injured plaintiff could pursue a judicial remedy only if
the plaintiff could fit the injury suffered into an established form of action by
pleading sufficient facts to show that the court should issue the writ that corresponded to that form of action.73 In other words, a cause of action for a
remedy at law existed when a form of action provided a remedy for the kind
of injury that the plaintiff had suffered.74
This understanding of the cause of action was part of the legal fabric
that late eighteenth-century lawyers and judges in England and America took
for granted. As F.W. Maitland explained, in the late eighteenth century “the
forms of action are given,” and “the causes of action must be deduced therefrom.”75 At this time, Maitland wrote, an aggrieved person might “find that,
plausible as his case may seem, it just will not fit any one of the receptacles
provided by the courts and he may take to himself the lesson that where
there is no remedy there is no wrong.”76 Thus, as Blackstone explained, the
specific remedy that an available writ provided was the “foundation of the
suit.”77
70 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 628.
71 Id. at 631.
72 See Bellia, supra note 66, at 792–99 (explaining the historical development of understandings of causes of action).
73 Id. at 789.
74 See id. at 787–89 (describing how lawyers and judges understood causes of action at
the time the Constitution was adopted); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA:
AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 9–10 (2d ed. 2003) (describing how common law writs determined, for example, the substance of tort law). The growth and decline of the writ system
is described in JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 87–100, 377–402 (2009).
75 F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 5
(1936).
76 Id. at 4–5.
77 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *272.
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When a person hath received an injury, and thinks it worth his while to
demand a satisfaction for it, he is to consider . . . what redress the law has
given for that injury; and thereupon is to make application or suit . . . for
that particular specific remedy.78

On this understanding, one had a cause of action only if one satisfied the
legal determinants necessary to obtain a remedy afforded by a particular
form of proceeding.79 Courts of equity and admiralty operated under a similar conception of the cause of action.80
As a practical matter, a plaintiff would commence an action at law by
seeking an appropriate “writ.” Each writ corresponded to a particular “form
of action.”81
Examples of original common law writs—designating particular forms of
action—included ejectment (to recover possession of real property), detinue (to recover possession of personal property based upon a superior
right), replevin (to recover possession of personal property wrongfully
taken), debt (to recover money due), covenant (to recover for breach of a
promise under seal), special assumpsit (to recover damages for breach of
contract), general (indebitatus) assumpsit (to recover damages in quasi contract), trespass (to recover damages for physical interference with person or
property), trespass on the case (to recover damages for wrongful acts resulting in indirect interference with person or property), and trover (to recover
damages for the conversion of chattel).82

The phrases “form of action” and “form of proceeding” both referred to the
kind of action that a specific writ authorized a person with a particular kind
of injury to pursue.83 Each distinct “cause of action” as defined by a distinct
writ “had its own mini-civil procedure system” for matters such as summons,
proof, and remedies.84 The phrase “mode of proceeding” sometimes
referred to the particular method for obtaining redress under a specific form
of proceeding, and sometimes was a synonym for “form of proceeding.”85
78 Id.
79 Bellia, supra note 66, at 783. As Henry John Stephen explained in his 1824 treatise
on pleading, “the enumeration of writs, and that of actions” is “identical”:
An original writ . . . is essential to the due institution of the suit. These
instruments have consequently had the effect of limiting and defining the right of
action itself; and no cases are considered as within the scope of judicial remedy,
in the English law, but those to which the language of some known writ is found
to apply, or for which some new writ, framed on the analogy of those already
existing, may, under the provision of the Statute of Westminster 2, be lawfully
devised. The enumeration of writs, and that of actions, have become, in this manner, identical.
HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 8
(Phila., Abraham Small 1824) (footnotes omitted).
80 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 633; Bellia, supra note 66, at 790.
81 MAITLAND, supra note 75, at 4.
82 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 633–34.
83 Id. at 634.
84 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 74, at 96.
85 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 635.
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The forms and modes of proceeding that defined legal causes of action
varied among the courts of different sovereigns. The forms and modes of
proceeding of U.S. states varied from each other and from the forms and
modes of proceeding that English common law courts used.86 An important
question for the First Congress was what forms and modes of proceeding—
and thus what causes of action—would be available in courts of the United
States.
2.

Congressional Authorization and State Causes of Action

The First Congress defined the causes of action that were available in
federal courts in the Process Act of 1789—and reenacted this legislation with
some revisions in 1792.87 As Professor Clark and I have explained elsewhere,
a late eighteenth-century reader of the Process Acts, knowledgeable of background legal principles, would have understood these acts to specify the
causes of action that Congress had authorized federal courts to hear.88 The
Process Act of 1792 remained in effect until 1872, when Congress replaced it
with the Conformity Act.89
During this period, the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 directed federal
courts to use state forms of proceeding in actions at law when Congress had
not otherwise enacted a cause of action. Congress always could and sometimes did create a specific cause of action for the enforcement of a federal
right.90 For most actions at law within the jurisdiction of federal courts, however, Congress did not create a cause of action even where it created a federal right. For such cases, the Process Acts directed federal courts to apply
the same forms of proceeding as the local state courts would apply.91
Professor Julius Goebel described the Process Acts as “doomed to be little regarded by historians, for the subject matter was hardly such to captivate
those to whom the larger aspects of institutional development were to be
more beguiling.”92 The Process Acts, however, were crucial to the development of federal courts—and they account for the source of causes of action
in federal courts through much of U.S. history.93
Initially, in section 14 of the First Judiciary Act, the First Congress gave
federal courts a general authority to issue writs—in other words, to adjudicate causes of action—“which may be necessary for the exercise of their
86 Id. at 637.
87 Id. at 641.
88 See id. at 641–55.
89 Id. at 655.
90 For example, the Patent Act of 1790 gave patent holders a federal right against
infringement and specified that the right was enforceable through an “action on the case,”
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793), a common law form of
proceeding.
91 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 653.
92 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 509 (1971).
93 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 646–47.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL508.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 19

justice scalia and implied rights of action

5-JUL-17

15:26

2095

respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”94
This general authorization was temporary, however, and the First Congress
quickly enacted more specific directives for federal courts.95 In developing
more specific directives, the First Congress had to decide whether to establish
uniform forms of proceedings for federal courts, or whether to have the
forms of proceeding available in federal courts track those available in state
courts. The Senate committee that drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789 initially
drafted a bill that attempted to establish some uniform rules of proceeding
for federal courts.96 Due in part to anti-Federalist opposition to “consolidated government,”97 however, Congress was unable to agree on a uniform
set of proceedings for federal courts.98 Instead, Congress enacted the Process Acts, which borrowed state forms of proceeding as the actions at law to
be used in federal court. As Maeva Marcus has explained, “the entire Process
Act of 1789 reflected Congress’s inability or unwillingness to agree on uniform rules for the operation of the federal courts.”99
The Process Act of 1789 provided that
the forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of process
and rates of fees, except fees to judges, in the circuit and district courts, in
suits at common law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now
used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.100

In other words, in actions at law a federal circuit or district court was to apply
the forms of writs and executions that the supreme court of the state in
which it sat would apply.101
Read in context, this provision defined the causes of action that federal
courts could enforce in actions at law. Specifically, it directed a federal court
to use the same causes of action that the courts of the state in which it sat
would use. As explained, the form of a writ defined a cause of action. For
example, under the Process Act, if a plaintiff wished to recover damages in
federal court for an intentionally inflicted bodily injury, the plaintiff would
seek a writ of trespass, so long as state law allowed such a writ, in the form
that state law provided. If a plaintiff sought a writ not recognized under state
law, then the plaintiff’s suit would fail because the district and circuit courts
could use only the same writs and forms of action as the courts of the state in
which they sat would use. Rather than adopt a uniform system of writs and
modes of process for actions at law in circuit and district courts, Congress
94 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
95 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 643–46 (discussing the meaning and import of
section 14).
96 See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800, at 115–18 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992).
97 GOEBEL, supra note 92, at 510.
98 See THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800, supra note 96, at 112.
99 Id.
100 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1792).
101 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 641.
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tethered federal courts to the forms of writs and modes of process that prevailed in state courts. For cases in equity and admiralty jurisdiction, the First
Congress provided that “the forms and modes of proceedings . . . shall be
according to the course of the civil law.”102
For various reasons, possibly including confusing language in the provision governing equity and admiralty cases, Congress reenacted the Process
Act, with some revisions, in 1792.103 The Process Act of 1792 provided that
“the forms of writs, executions and other process, except their style and the
forms and modes of proceeding in suits in those of common law shall be the
same as are now used in the said courts respectively in pursuance of [the
Process Act of 1789].”104 In this provision, Congress continued the requirement of the original Process Act that federal courts apply state forms of writs.
In the second Process Act, however, Congress replaced the phrase “mode of
process” with the phrase “forms and modes of proceeding.”105 It is unclear
why Congress made this change, but, whatever the reason, the new language
strengthened the directive that federal courts apply state forms of proceeding—and therefore state causes of action—in suits at law. In the eighteenth
century, courts in England and America routinely used the phrases “form of
proceeding” and “mode of proceeding” to define not only what today we
categorize as “procedure,” but also the causes of action that gave plaintiffs a
right to a legal remedy.106 In time, the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to require “static” conformity to state forms and modes of proceeding
as they existed in 1792 when the Act was adopted, rather than conformity to
how they might develop in the future.107 The Process Act of 1792 also dispelled any confusion that might have surrounded the language of the 1789
Act governing equity and admiralty cases. The 1792 Act provided that the
“forms and modes of proceeding” in cases “of equity” and “of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction” were to be “according to the principles, rules and
usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law.”108 This provision
thus adopted English equity and admiralty forms of proceeding as the causes
of action available in the federal courts’ equity and admiralty jurisdiction.

102 § 2, 1 Stat. at 93–94. The reference in this provision to the “civil law” may have been
ambiguous and confusing to lawyers at the time, insofar as it could refer either to civil law
legal systems or to the “civilian” equity practice in England. See Bellia & Clark, supra note
66, at 649. Whatever Congress meant by the “civil law,” the provision authorized federal
courts to provide remedies in equity and admiralty only according to such law.
103 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 651–52.
104 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872).
105 Id.
106 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 652.
107 Id. at 653; see Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 59 (1825);
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49–50 (1825).
108 § 2, 1 Stat. at 276.
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The Process Act of 1792 established a framework that federal courts
internalized and rarely had reason to discuss in their opinions.109 This
framework continued in force until 1872, when Congress replaced it with the
first Conformity Act.110 Whereas the Process Act of 1792, as interpreted by
the Court, required “static” conformity to state forms of proceeding as they
existed in 1792, the Conformity Act adopted a principle of “dynamic” conformity, directing federal courts to apply state legal forms of proceeding
“existing at the time” a case was heard.111
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, with the rise
of code pleading, the source of the causes of action available in state and
federal courts gradually shifted from the realm of “procedure” to the realm
of “substance.”112 Even as this shift occurred, however, federal courts continued to apply state law causes of action under applicable federal statutes. If
states still applied traditional common law forms of action, then federal
courts borrowed them under the Conformity Act. If, however, states enacted
statutes abolishing forms of proceeding and defining causes of action outside
the realm of “procedure,” then federal courts applied the resulting state
causes of action as “rules of decision” under section 34 of the First Judiciary
Act.113
It was during this period of transition under the Conformity Act that the
Court decided Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby114—a case widely viewed
as the Court’s seminal implied-rights-of-action case. The question in Rigsby
was whether the plaintiff had a cause of action against the railroad for violating the Federal Safety Appliance Act.115 In Rigsby, the Court observed that
the Act did not contain “express language conferring a right of action for the
death or injury of an employee.”116 Nonetheless, the Court explained, “the
safety of employees and travelers is [the Act’s] principle object, and the right
of private action by an injured employee . . . has never been doubted.”117
The Court cited a number of its own cases (plus a few Court of Appeals
cases) for the proposition that
[a] disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied, according to a doctrine of the common law.118
109 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 667–77 (describing federal judicial practice
pursuant to the Process Acts).
110 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (repealed 1934).
111 Id.
112 See Bellia, supra note 66, 792–99 (describing this shift).
113 Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 655–56.
114 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
115 Id. at 37–39.
116 Id. at 39.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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The Supreme Court cases that the Court cited were ones adjudicating either
a state law negligence action or an action on the case under the old forms of
action. Some of these cases were originally litigated in the federal courts’
diversity jurisdiction,119 and others were originally litigated in state court and
appealed to the Supreme Court because they involved a disputed issue of
federal law.120 In one case, the defendant removed a state law action of trespass on the case to federal court on the ground that liability was based on a
violation of the federal safety appliance act.121 None of the cases that Rigsby
cited established that federal courts could create a cause of action as a matter
of federal common law—independent of state law and the Conformity Act—
for a federal statutory violation.
Rigsby nonetheless has come to be regarded as the seminal impliedrights-of-action case in the Supreme Court. This status may derive in part
from the Court’s suggestion in Rigsby that the cause of action arose by inference from the federal statute itself. The Rigsby Court determined that, by
implication, the statute itself created a remedy: “[T]he Act must therefore be
deemed to create a liability in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”122 The Court found
“[t]he inference of a private right of action . . . irresistible” by a provision of
the Act that governed assumption of risk, and therefore presumed the existence of a private right of action in favor of injured plaintiffs.123 Although
Rigsby contains some confusing language, the Court ultimately concluded
that the Act itself created a right of action, albeit by implication. In this
respect, Rigsby did not rely on a federal judicial power to create federal common law causes of action. It found that the statute itself created the right of
action.
Two decades later, the Court backed away from Rigsby’s inference that
the Safety Appliance Act itself created a private right of action for a remedy.
In 1934, in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,124 the Court explained
Rigsby as follows: “The Safety Appliance Acts having prescribed the duty [of
the employer] in this fashion, the right to recover damages sustained by the
injured employee through the breach of duty sprang from the principle of
119 See Delk v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 580 (1911) (state negligence action
removed to federal court diversity jurisdiction); Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904)
(same); Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Voelker, 129 F. 522 (8th Cir. 1904) (negligence action
in diversity); Denver & R.G. R. Co. v. Arrighi, 129 F. 347 (8th Cir. 1904) (negligence action
in diversity); Cleveland, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Baker, 91 F. 224 (7th Cir. 1899) (action
of trespass on the case in diversity).
120 See Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester, & Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1 (1907)
(reviewing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on a writ of error); St.
Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. Corp. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908) (reviewing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas on a writ of error).
121 Chi. Junction Ry. v. King, 169 F. 372 (7th Cir. 1909); see Transcript of Record, Chi.
Junction Ry. v. King, 222 U.S. 222 (1911) (No. 34).
122 Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 40.
123 Id.
124 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
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the common law and was left to be enforced accordingly.”125 By “common
law,” the Court in Moore meant state common law. The Court explained that
“nothing in the Safety Appliance Acts precluded the State from incorporating in its legislation applicable to local transportation the paramount duty
which the Safety Appliance Acts imposed as to the equipment of cars used on
interstate railroads.”126 An action for a violation of the Act, the Court thus
explained in Moore,
fell within the familiar category of cases involving the duty of a master to his
servant. This duty is defined by the common law, except as it may be modified by legislation. The federal statute, in the present case, touched the duty
of the master at a single point and, save as provided in the statute, the right
of the plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by the law of the
State.127

In other words, the Moore Court described Rigsby as a state negligence per se
action premised on the violation of a federal statute.
Under this analysis, when state courts came to treat substantive rather
than procedural law as the source of causes of action in common law cases,
federal courts relied on state law to determine the causes of action available
for the violation of federal statutes that themselves did not create a cause of
action. Although Rigsby suggested that a federal statute itself created a cause
of action by implication—an analysis the Moore Court later disclaimed—Rigsby did not suggest that federal courts could create causes of action as a matter of federal common law. Rather, if a federal statute did not create a cause
of action, federal courts either continued to borrow state forms of action
(where they continued to exist under state law) or applied state causes of
action (where substantive state law defined them).
In 1938, federal courts finally promulgated their own uniform rules of
procedure. Congress repealed the Conformity Act in 1934 when it adopted
the Rules Enabling Act—and thereby repealed the authority of federal courts
to apply state forms of action where they still existed.128 The Rules Enabling
Act authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe uniform rules of procedure
for federal courts,129 and the Supreme Court eliminated the forms of action
in federal court in 1938 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.130 Prior to
1938, federal courts used state forms of proceeding under the Conformity
Act. After 1938, federal courts used their own uniform procedures under the
125 Id. at 215 (citation omitted) (citing Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39, 40).
126 Id. at 216.
127 Id. at 216–17 (quoting Minneapolis, St. Paul, & Sault Ste. Marie R. Co. v. Popplar,
237 U.S. 369, 372 (1915)).
128 See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
129 Id.
130 FED. R. CIV. P. (1938). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are no
specific forms of proceeding for different kinds of cases; instead, there is just “one form of
action—the civil action.” Id. 2.
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Rules Enabling Act, but continued to apply substantive state law, absent preemption by federal law, under Erie.
Post Erie, federal courts may still use causes of action defined by state
substantive law to provide remedies for the violation of federal statutory
rights—so long as the case falls within federal court jurisdiction. In some
cases, however, no state law cause of action will be available to remedy a federal statutory violation. Even if a state law cause of action is available to remedy the violation of a federal statute, it might not fall within the original
jurisdiction of federal courts.131 A state law cause of action might also be
subject to limitations to which a federal cause of action would not. An important question, then, has been when federal courts may adjudicate a federal
right of action—sufficient to establish “arising under” jurisdiction—for the
violation of a federal statute that does not itself create a right of action.
B.

Lessons from Historical Practice

As described above, scholars have argued that courts should not treat
the question of whether a private right of action is available for the violation
of a federal statute as a question of statutory interpretation. Rather, they
have argued, historical practice demonstrates that federal courts traditionally
supplied rights of action for federal statutory violations from “the common
law.”132 This understanding overlooks the fact that for most of U.S. history
federal courts had congressional authorization under the Process Acts (and
later the Conformity Acts) to provide common law remedies for federal statutory violations if state law would afford them. The idea that federal courts
provided common law remedies on their own initiative is a myth.
That said, the fact that federal courts provided private common law remedies for federal statutory violations with congressional authorization does
131 In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1985), the Supreme
Court held that federal courts lacked “arising under” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
over a state negligence per se action based on the violation of a federal law that did not
itself create a cause of action. Later, in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005), the Court held that a federal court has “arising
under” jurisdiction over a cause of action not created by federal law when “a state-law claim
necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal
and state judicial responsibilities.” Id. at 314.
132 Even if this were true, it would not establish that federal courts today may provide a
right of action that is itself sufficient to create “arising under” jurisdiction. As explained,
historically a right of action was a function of local procedural law. A plaintiff had a right
of action if a form of action fit the alleged injury to the plaintiff’s legal right or title.
During the time that that understanding prevailed, a case arose not under the source of
law that created the form of action, but rather under the law that conferred the right or
title that the plaintiff sought to enforce through a form of action. See Bellia & Clark, supra
note 66, at 642 n.151 (explaining these matters in more detail). For this reason, the fact
that Congress authorized federal courts to use state forms of action did not mean that any
cause brought in federal court under such a form of action was one arising under federal
law.
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not in itself prove that federal courts would have lacked power to provide
common law remedies had Congress not provided any such authorization.
There is good reason to think, however, that federal courts would not have
been understood to have power to hear private common law causes of action
without congressional authorization to do so. First, many members of the
founding generation expressed fears over unrestrained federal judicial
power. The choice for the First Congress was whether to define uniform
forms of proceeding for federal courts or to tie them to state law. It does not
appear that allowing an unrestrained federal judicial power to define causes
of action for federal courts was a discussed option. Second, in the case of
criminal actions, where Congress largely remained silent, a vigorous debate
ensued regarding whether federal courts had power to entertain criminal
actions that Congress had not created. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held
that federal courts lacked such power under the separation of powers that
the Constitution established.
1.

The Early Debate over Federal Judicial Power

When the First Congress met in 1789, a contest ensued between those
who favored more centralized federal judicial power and those who favored
preserving the powers of localized state courts.133 Opponents of creating
inferior federal courts argued that such courts would be inconvenient for
litigants, especially defendants sued in distant courts.134 They also expressed
concern that federal courts might use unfamiliar and novel procedures,135
and might exercise unrestrained equity powers.136
In the First Judiciary Act, members of Congress made an initial compromise for establishing federal courts for the United States. The Act created
district and circuit courts, but defined and limited their respective jurisdictions in significant ways.137 The Act also contained important directions
regarding the sources of law that federal courts were to apply. In section 34,
the Act directed federal judges to apply local state law rules of decision in
actions at law absent preemption by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States: “[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the
courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”138 Although only a
133 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 638–40.
134 See GOEBEL, supra note 92, at 472–73 (describing such claims).
135 See THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800, supra note 96, at 8, 14–15 (discussing such issues).
136 See id. at 12.
137 The First Judiciary Act defined most of the jurisdiction of federal courts in sections
9–13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9–13, 1 Stat. 73, 76–81. In sections 14–17, the Act
proceeded to confer certain powers on federal courts. Id. §§ 14–17, 1 Stat. at 81–83.
138 Id. § 34, 1 Stat. at 92.
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limited record survives regarding the drafting of this text,139 it is believed
that “[t]he addition of section 34 was induced . . . by the need for some
positive direction regarding the basic law by which the new courts were to be
governed.”140 In addition, section 16 of the Act prohibited federal courts
from entertaining suits in equity when an adequate remedy existed at law.141
Section 16 thus restrained federal courts from exercising their equity jurisdiction beyond its conventional limits, thereby protecting the rights of litigants
to a jury trial when a legal form of action was available to remedy a claimed
injury.
Given these compromises and limitations, the First Congress does not
appear to have considered the possibility of leaving federal judges free to
decide for themselves what causes of action would be available in federal
courts. The question that members of Congress debated was whether Congress should try to create uniform forms of proceeding for federal courts, or
whether Congress instead should have the forms of proceeding available in
federal courts track those available in state courts. No one appears to have
suggested that Congress should (or could) leave federal judges free to decide
for themselves what forms of proceeding would be available in federal courts.
In the end, the First Congress instructed federal courts to borrow the forms
of proceeding governing actions at law in the courts of the state where the
federal court was located. This instruction served “to quiet the alarums
raised regarding the threatened inconvenience of the federal system.”142
Given fears at the time of unrestrained federal judicial power, it seems
unlikely that those involved in these debates generally understood that federal courts had power to decide for themselves what rights of action they
could adjudicate.
2.

The Early Debate over Federal Common Law Crimes

The early debate over federal common law crimes also suggests that any
power in federal courts to decide for themselves what private rights of action
they would entertain would have been, at a minimum, contested. Whereas
Congress specified the causes of action that federal courts could adjudicate
in civil cases, Congress defined few crimes in the early years of the United
States.143 Believing that the peace and security of the United States required
more federal crimes, some federal executive officials and judges argued that
federal courts could adjudicate common law crimes.144 Certain early
139 See GOEBEL, supra note 92, at 502 (“Nothing more is known of its genesis than that
the text is written out on a chit in Ellsworth’s hand and marked for page 15.”).
140 Id.
141 Congress provided in section 16 “[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in
either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete
remedy may be had at law.” Judiciary Act of 1789 § 16, 1 Stat. at 82.
142 GOEBEL, supra note 92, at 473.
143 The Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, defined only a few federal offenses.
144 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 661–67 (describing the use of federal common
law crimes in the early republic).
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Supreme Court Justices embraced the idea of federal common law crimes
while riding circuit,145 but the Supreme Court did not address the power of
federal courts to adjudicate federal common law crimes until 1812. In United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin,146 the Court held that federal courts lack power
to adjudicate common law criminal prosecutions. Before a federal court may
entertain a criminal case, the Court explained, “[t]he legislative authority of
the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and
declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”147 Accordingly,
the Court established that federal courts had no power to entertain criminal
actions absent authorization from Congress to do so.
Because the First Congress immediately specified in the Process Acts the
civil causes of action that federal courts could hear, no similar debate
occurred over whether federal courts could hear common law civil actions.
Had Congress not specified the causes of action that federal courts could
hear in civil cases, it is possible that a parallel debate would have ensued.
And had that debate ensued, it would have involved the question whether the
Constitution adopted the common law, or certain aspects of it, for the United
States as a whole. There were strong arguments at the time—some made in
debates over federal common law crimes—that federal courts could not
adopt the common law in whole or in part on their own. James Madison, for
example, argued that incorporation of the common law would have been
inconsistent with the Constitution’s enumeration of limited federal powers.
Madison rejected the notion “‘that the common or unwritten law’ . . . makes
a part of the law of these States, in their united and national capacity.”148
Specifically, Madison argued that any such understanding of the incorporation of the common law would be inconsistent with the Constitution’s enumeration of limited federal powers. In his view, such incorporation would
mean that “the authority of Congress [would be] co-extensive with the
objects of common law”—that is, Congress “would be authorized to legislate
in all cases whatsoever.”149 Moreover, a judicial power to adopt common law
for the nation would “erect [federal judges] into legislators” by requiring
them to decide which parts of the common law were properly applicable to
the circumstances of the United States.150 The Supreme Court agreed with
this position in Hudson & Goodwin in 1812, and the Court reaffirmed it two
decades later in Wheaton v. Peters:
It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent
states; each of which may have its local usages, customs and common law.
There is no principle which pervades the union and has the authority of law,
145 Id. at 663.
146 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
147 Id. at 34.
148 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 18, 1800), in VI THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 347, 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
149 Id. at 380.
150 Id. at 381.
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that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the union. The common
law could be made a part of our federal system, only by legislative
adoption.151

Had Congress not provided federal courts with direction regarding the private rights of action they could enforce, perhaps a debate parallel to that
over federal common law crimes would have ensued. And perhaps that
debate would have reached the same resolution, forcing Congress to specify
the civil causes of action federal courts could hear, had Congress not done so
when it first created federal courts.
***
The point for now is that critics of Justice Scalia’s approach have overlooked the fact that early Congresses did in fact specify the legal causes of
action that federal courts could hear in civil cases—including in cases seeking a remedy for the violation of a federal statute. Accordingly, the argument
that Justice Scalia’s approach to implied rights of action is inconsistent with
historical judicial practice rests on a false premise. Federal courts did not
historically exercise a power to supply a cause of action under any freewheeling idea of the common law, or by appeal to any conception of ambient general common law. Instead, federal courts had congressional authorization to
provide a cause of action for the violation of a federal statute, so long as such
a cause of action was available under state law. Justice Scalia’s approach to
implied rights of action requires a legislative determination that a cause of
action is available for the violation of a federal statute before a court may
provide one. Regardless of whether historical practice requires this
approach, it certainly does not disprove it.
CONCLUSION
In the last several decades, the Supreme Court has moved from treating
the existence of a private right of action for the violation of a federal statute
as a question of federal common law to treating the existence of such an
action as a question of congressional intent. Justice Scalia influenced this
shift in significant ways. First, he advanced the argument that federal courts
should allow private rights of action for federal statutory violations only if
Congress intended courts to do so. Second, he argued that federal courts
should determine congressional intent through a textual method of interpretation. A majority of the Court joined him in this approach in Alexander v.
Sandoval.
One critique of this approach is that it is not faithful to historical judicial
practice. Justice Scalia himself was well known for arguing that historical
practice should inform questions of constitutional meaning, including questions of federal judicial power. Many scholars have argued that federal courts
should be understood to have power to enforce federal common law causes
of action for federal statutory violations because historically federal courts
151

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834).
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supplied common law causes of action for such violations. This argument is
based on a false premise. It is true enough that federal courts supplied common law causes of action to remedy federal statutory violations in certain
cases, but they did so only pursuant to congressional authorization. In the
Process Acts and the Conformity Acts, Congress directed federal courts to
borrow state forms of proceeding—in other words, state causes of action—in
common law cases. Later, as states abolished forms of proceeding and began
defining causes of action in substantive state law, federal courts applied state
law causes of action to remedy federal statutory violations. The contention
that federal courts historically applied “the common law” in affording causes
of action for statutory violations—and thus should be understood to have
power to do so today regardless of congressional authorization—rests on an
incomplete account of federal judicial history.
For much of U.S. history, federal courts heard causes of action for the
violation of federal statutes because Congress authorized them to do so. Justice Scalia argued that federal courts may hear causes of action to remedy
federal statutory violations only if Congress determines that a cause of action
is available. Regardless of whether the historical practice of congressional
authorization of rights of action in federal courts requires this approach, it
certainly does not disprove it.
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